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“How can I describe 
 my emotions at this 
 catastrophe…?”
Frankenstein, Walton and the Monster
SIBYLLE ERLE
Abstract: This essay reiterates the importance of Captain Robert Walton in Shelley’s novel. Walton 
is the addressee of Frankenstein’s story and drawing attention to his presence helps with unrav-
elling the complexity of the creation scene. The focus is on physiognomical creation, i.e. not only 
on Frankenstein’s body-making but also his aesthetic response to both the immobile and animated 
body. Though the Creature’s physical ugliness may be a matter of degree, Frankenstein contradicts 
himself in his description of its effects. He also appears to have expected that animation would 
not substantially have interfered with the anticipated reality of the animated Creature. But it does. 
Shelley, it has been argued, revised Adam Smith’s ideas about sympathy, suggesting that — if a per-
son inspires terror compensatory sympathy can be achieved through narrative. Is Walton able to 
handle the monster because he knows it? The essay discusses the dynamic between the visual and 
the auditory in Frankenstein to argue that Shelley responds to Johann Caspar Lavater’s Essays 
on Physiognomy (1789-98).
This essay examines the theme of identity in Frankenstein (1818) by contextualising 
the Creature’s looks and speech with Mary Shelley’s response to the face-reading 
practices of the Swiss theologian, writer and physiognomist Johann Caspar Lavater 
(1757–1801). Lavater had been writing on physiognomy, the ancient art of face read-
ing, since the early 1770s. Stressing the importance of appearance, he claimed that 
physiognomy’s potential for character assessment could be harnessed and developed 
into the science of character, making the judgement of one person of any other an 
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objective and, therefore, safe and reliable affair. Lavater was an avid collector of 
prints and portraits and eventually published his findings as the heavily-illustrated 
four-volume Physiognomische Fragmente (1775–78). The physiognomy project, which was 
controversial from the start, had a complicated publication history; it was abridged, 
revised as well as expanded and translated, appearing as two authorised and sev-
eral pirated translations in England in the 1790s ( Johnson 52–74). This essay reads 
Frankenstein as a response to Lavater’s discussion and representation of body-soul 
relationships; the idea that it is possible to pin them down and arrive at conclusive 
readings of character was at the heart of Lavater’s physiognomy. Shelley responds 
to Lavater’s approach by engaging with the question of identity and the claim that 
the soul imprints itself into the body (Caflisch-Schnetzler 99). Throughout her novel, 
the Creature’s identity is imposed, interpreted and regulated by the responses of oth-
ers. Appearance is of importance to the Creature’s sense of self and yet, this sense of 
self is not completely reliant on the encounters he has. He is judged repeatedly on 
his appearance alone but Shelley (contrary to Lavater) gives the Creature his own 
voice, allowing him to ponder his situation in life:
And what was I? Of my creation and creator I was absolutely igno-
rant; but I knew that I […] hideously deformed and loathsome; I was 
not even of the same nature as man. I was more agile than they, 
and could subsist upon coarser diet; I bore the extremes of heat 
and cold with less injury to my frame; my stature far exceeded 
theirs. When I looked around, I saw and heard of none like me. 
Was I then a monster, a blot upon the earth, from which all men fled, 
and whom all men disowned? (96)
In this passage, the Creature is reflecting on the lived experience of failed social 
interactions. His appearance has prevented any kind of social exchange. Aware of 
his extraordinary physical abilities, the Creature continues to compare himself with 
those he cannot meet at close range. Initially, he does not identify himself as a new 
species; this happens later, when he asks Frankenstein for a mate. He thinks of him-
self as human-like and “other” because he does not find acceptance and there is no 
answer to his searching question, only “groans” (97).
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The theme of identity recurs in the De Lacey scene with De Lacey asking, “who 
are you?” (Shelley 110). The blind man formulates this question after listening to the 
Creature’s pleas for protection: “You and your family are the friends whom I seek. 
Do not you desert me in the hour of trial” (110). When the Creature accepts the invi-
tation to enter the cottage, he knows that he has very little time to win De Lacey 
over. He thinks that he could succeed because the De Laceys, too, were wronged 
outsiders. Talking about the family with admiration, the Creature reveals his fear 
of approaching and befriending them:
They are kind — they are the most excellent creatures in the world; 
but unfortunately, they are prejudiced against me. I have good 
dispositions; my life has been hitherto harmless, and, in some 
degree, beneficial; but a fatal prejudice clouds their eyes, and 
where they ought to see a feeling and kind friend, they behold 
only a detestable monster. (109)
Listening to the explanation, De Lacey cannot imagine the speaker to be other 
than human and yet, he is unsure about his character. He has no way of telling whom 
he is dealing with without the visual image. De Lacey relies on speech. In the novel, 
moreover, it does not say that De Lacey ever touches the Creature: “I am blind, and 
cannot judge your countenance, but there is something in your words which per-
suades me that you are sincere. I am poor, and an exile; but it will afford me true 
pleasure to be in any way serviceable to a human creature” (109). The scene ends 
abruptly and with the return of De Lacey’s children. There is no stopping them; 
the Creature, who is driven away, is furious.
The Creature’s self-identification as formless or monstrous is built from the so-
called mirror scene and the moment the Creature grasps the reason for his isola-
tion; when looking into a pool, he realises that he looks different:
I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers — their grace, beauty, 
and delicate complexions: but how was I terrified, when I viewed 
myself in a transparent pool! At first I started back, unable to 
believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror: and 
when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster 
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that I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence 
and mortification. Alas! I did not yet entirely know the fatal effects 
of this miserable deformity. (Shelley 90)
Struggling to recognise himself, the Creature is distraught because, despite the evi-
dence he feels that he resembles the cottagers, having aspired to become like them 
in conduct and language. While living in the hovel behind the cottage, he listens 
and learns. The expression “in reality” (90) implies that he is beginning to under-
stand the impact of his appearance.
The mirror scene raises interesting questions about the representability of the 
face (Dutroit 850), but it is doubtful whether the Creature refers to his face only 
when he considers his physical identity, e.g. if he separates his face from his body. 
The final sentence of the recognition scene (quoted above) adds poignancy to the 
Creature’s reflections but it also projects his inner strength. The Creature acknowl-
edges his physical identity and, as Paul Youngquist notes, would never forget the 
“material fact of his physical deformity” (53). Only after De Lacey is rescued by his 
panic-stricken children (Shelley 110) does he accept that opinions of others do mat-
ter. The intervention in the De Lacey scene, in other words, affirms the reality of the 
deformed body. Regarding Lavater’s physiognomical practice, the Creature, though 
rejected by his maker, resists; when looking into the pool, he sees what others see, 
but he also disagrees and proposes an alternative interpretation. As a result of his 
botched creation, moral goodness and physical deformity have been fused into one, 
clashing image of himself. It is precisely this fusion which he wants to challenge as 
soon as he realises that it has caused his exclusion.
On the continent, Lavater had been criticised and ridiculed ever since the pub-
lication of Von der Physiognomik (1772) and Shelley would have known this. She was 
travelling and staying in Switzerland where Lavater had died in 1801. When the 
physiognomy project was translated into English, no changes were made; emphasis 
was put on physiognomy’s potential to develop into a science (Shookman 5). As well 
as admitting that he was still at the information-gathering stage, Lavater declared: 
“I neither will, nor can write a complete Treatise on the Science of Physiognomies. 
My ambition is limited to a few simple Essays; and the Fragments which I give, never 
can compose a Whole” (1). Lavater’s ideas about “science,” a word used somewhat 
loosely in Essays on Physiognomy, resonate with the approach to science in Frankenstein, 
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because Frankenstein is utterly convinced of the significance and value of his pro-
ject so that he ignores all criticism and proceeds to work on it on his own (Shelley 
35). Like Lavater, Frankenstein would not cease until he achieved his goal. Yet his 
determination is a calculated decision on Shelley’s part, as her contemporaries would 
not have approved of Frankenstein’s ambition. What she proposes through this fic-
tional character’s ambition is a radical idea.
The belief in the literal truth of the creation story was prevalent at the time. All 
of humanity was formed in God’s image. In Frankenstein, it is through science that 
new life is created, which suggests that the scene in the laboratory is Shelley’s ‘mod-
ern’ interpretation of divine creation. It has often been pointed out that the conver-
sations about science in June 1816 inspired the first incarnation of Frankenstein, e.g. 
the ghost story written on 16 June 1816. Percy Bysshe Shelley was Mary Shelley’s 
source and teacher. He was involved in the writing, composed the first, anonymous 
preface, and his review, which calls the Creature an “abomination and anomaly,” 
suggests that it is the lack of social relations that caused his moral badness (Hatch 33).
Shelley’s novel renders the relationship between creator and creation as close 
and interdependent. This allows for a combination of science (Frankenstein) with 
self-knowledge (Creature) and leads directly to Lavater and the objective of Essays 
on Physiognomy which, according to the work’s title-page, is to “promote the knowl-
edge and love of mankind.” Lavater was a pastor and committed to physiognomy 
because he believed that the more that could be known about a person, the easier 
it was to love this person (1). He never acknowledged the consequences his theory 
could have and continuously appealed to his readers to understand that his phys-
iognomy was work in progress. It was only natural that he was making the occa-
sional mistake (1). In Frankenstein, though nobody should know the Creature better 
than Frankenstein, only Walton, a fleeting acquaintance, is able to see him for what 
he is. For Walton, who is writing to his sister, the Creature is a tragic figure: “Great 
God! What a scene has just taken place! I am yet dizzy with the remembrance of 
it. I hardly know whether I shall have the power to detail it; yet the tale which I have 
recorded would be incomplete without this final and wonderful catastrophe” (Shelley 
186). Is this also Shelley’s position?
Shelley’s relation to Lavater’s face-reading practice provides a historical as well 
as intellectual context for Frankenstein’s relation to the Creature. Shelley does not 
reveal how the body is animated. Frankenstein mentions that he “collected the 
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instruments of life around” him so that he could “infuse a spark of being into the 
lifeless thing” (Shelley 38).1 In the so-called laboratory scene, creation is presented 
as a supernatural event. When Frankenstein embarks on the second experiment, 
the creation of a female body in the Orkneys, the scene is less Gothic; Frankenstein 
appears to be in control. He is confident that he will succeed and improve on the 
first experiment. This time, however, he hesitates and decides not to complete the 
experiment for moral reasons: “Had I a right, for my own benefit, to inflict this 
curse upon everlasting generations?” (138). Shelley, of course, returns and rises to 
the provocations of her novel and especially the “spark” of life in her introduction 
to the 1831 edition. Yet the Gothic qualities of the creation scene (i.e. the absence 
of any explanation in the 1818 edition) prompts the question, I think, whether it 
had occurred to Shelley that the Creature could not have a soul, the most radical 
idea posed by her text.2 After all, she equipped the Creature with a sense of self 
and he never doubts that he has a soul. What makes him human is his capacity for 
love and compassion.
Far too much attention has been paid to the scene set in the laboratory and it 
seems that interpretations of the novel have been overshadowed by its cinematic 
reception. This essay concentrates on the encounters of Frankenstein and Captain 
Robert Walton with the Creature, reading methods of character assessment against 
methods of observations recommended in Lavater’s Essays on Physiognomy. The pro-
posed interpretation negotiates Shelley’s treatment of body-soul relationships in the 
designation process of character and the Creature’s attempts at finding out where he 
belongs, i.e. two important aspects of the identity theme. In the novel, the Creature’s 
moral deformity increases on account of the murders he commits, while his phys-
ical deformity stays the same. The growing divide is at odds with one of Lavater’s 
core beliefs, that the surface embodies a hidden depth. The Creature, moreover, 
keeps returning to this contradiction when he tells his life-story to explain about his 
1 Samuel Holmes Vasbinder interprets the absence of scientific explanation as a stylistic decision: 
“The processes producing the invention or technological advancement are carefully shrouded in 
mystery. In concealing the secret of the spark of life. Mary anticipates the method of the specula-
tive fiction story in general” (26).
2 Martin Willis wonders at the soul’s physicality in Shelley’s “Transformation” (1831), a Faustian 
short story about the bargaining and recovery of a protagonist’s soul. Willis reminds us that Shelley, 
possibly because of her husband, would have been “most enamoured by romantic philosophy” 
(Willis 25) and interprets the creature as a symbol of “scientific materialism” (27), while claiming 
that the reason for the monster’s animation is that “electricity also gave a soul” (32).
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appearance. He actively counteracts the assumptions made about the connection 
between his body and soul. The overall uncertainty about the connection between 
face and inner self plays an important part in the novel’s engagement with the need 
for compassion. There is a continuous parallel between the novel’s struggle with 
trusting the face and Lavater’s many uncertainties about the face as a representa-
tion of character, so much so that we may read Frankenstein as a re-enactment of the 
problems of representation in Lavater’s Essays on Physiognomy.
Much has been made of Frankenstein as an unreliable narrator. His relation-
ship with the Creature has been discussed many times over both through the lens of 
psychoanalytical theories and in terms of a doubling effect. The narrative structure, 
the narrative frames, the repetition of parts of the story and deteriorating states of 
mind or dream visions are familiar Gothic devices. They have also been interpreted 
as threats to the symbolic order and political authority (Mellor; Paulson). Walton 
is important, because he is the addressee of Frankenstein’s story. Drawing atten-
tion to his presence helps at unravelling the complexity of the creation scene. This 
scene is really only a story told by Frankenstein to Walton. The meeting between 
Walton and the Creature, by comparison, takes place in real-narrative time and, 
Walton’s reaction to the Creature, like that of Frankenstein, is by no means straight-
forward. He is familiar with the life stories of Frankenstein and the Creature. Should 
he feel and show compassion for both? Walton, because he has learnt much about 
the Creature from the story, is a well-prepared observer, who decides, when meet-
ing the Creature on board his ship, to listen (against Frankenstein’s advice) but also 
not to look when listening. Why does he keep his eyes averted? Is it that only by not 
looking that compassion can be achieved? The relationship between the visual and 
the auditory in Frankenstein is far more complex than has so far been acknowledged.
In The Surprising Effects of Sympathy (1988), David Marshall argues that sympa-
thy in Frankenstein fails because of “fellow feeling” being converted into “aesthetic 
pleasure” rather than compassion (179).3 Marshall draws on the eighteenth-century 
philosopher, Adam Smith, who, in exploring the motivation of selfish or benevolent 
human behaviour, develops the concept of the sympathetic spectator, explaining 
in his highly influential Theory of Moral Sentiment (1759) about the process of sympa-
thy: “The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the considera-
tion of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation, 
3 See also: Britton 6; Hatch 34.
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and, what perhaps is impossible, was at the same time able to regard it with his pre-
sent reason and judgment” (Smith 7). Implied is that there need to be two subjects, 
the observer and the observed, and that the observer can never feel what the other 
feels but only what they would feel in the other’s situation. The desired outcome 
of the imagined changing-of-places is the assessment of moral conduct (Marshall 
222). Analysing Smith’s conflation of the discourses of disability and aesthetics, Paul 
Kelleher delineates that for the model and its alignment of sympathy and judgement 
to work, Smith cannot but insist that spectators can control emotional responses so 
as not to completely identify with the observed. This would be counter-productive 
(Kelleher 45). James Chandler, who examines the problem of sympathy in the con-
text of the sentimental tradition, writes that Frankenstein is a “staging of mixed feel-
ings”; it is never made clear whether the Creature becomes or is a monster to start 
with (249). As Chandler stresses, all characters in the novel are driven by the search 
for companionship. The Creature himself “makes repeated efforts to forge a human 
connection” (247). However, we cannot talk of any kind of proper interaction or social 
situations in Frankenstein, because those who look at the Creature either run away or 
attack. They have no self-control which means that they have no time to understand, 
let alone conceive the Creature’s situation. In the De Lacey scene, the Creature 
comments that Felix intervenes at once and with “supernatural force” (Shelley 110). 
This would suggest that the failure of sympathy in Frankenstein is a failure to check 
or manage the emotions triggered by the Creature’s human-like yet extremely dis-
figured appearance. According to Smith, a social context is necessary for sympa-
thy to be felt and acted out. In Frankenstein, the Creature’s search for companionship 
remains dependent on the outcome of first impressions, just as in Lavater’s approach 
to physiognomy. In Essays on Physiognomy, Lavater’s character readings tend to be 
based on the impression captured by a single portrait.
Adam Smith’s model relies on interpersonal relations as well as social situa-
tions. Without any reference point, a malformed person, Smith speculates, would 
never recognise their deviation from the norm (107). Only through the reactions 
of others can they learn about themselves: “Our first ideas of personal beauty and 
deformity, are drawn from the shape and appearance of others, not from our own. 
We soon become sensible, however, that others exercise the same criticism upon 
us. We are pleased when they approve our figure, and are disobliged when they 
seem to be disgusted” (100). Social interaction is important because, without it, 
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humans would never develop into moral beings. To put this differently, what connects 
Smith’s thinking to Lavater’s is that Smith’s aesthetic theory is also a moral theory. 
Late eighteenth-century physiognomy, i.e. the version championed by Lavater, pro-
vides a fitting context for a discussion of the pursuit of sympathy in the midst of a soci-
ety which is unable to identify with the monstrous other. Lavater proposes a process 
of sympathy which is sustained by self-knowledge. The better we read ourselves, 
the better we can understand others. While Smith talks about projection or virtual 
identification, Lavater explores close human relationships and focuses on physical 
likeness, which he says is the reason for friendship (Erle 95–114).4 In Frankenstein, all 
attempts at friendship fail. Since nobody is exactly like the Creature — he literally 
doesn’t fit in — nobody can ever feel for him.
Shelley uses physical description to build the characters of Frankenstein’s teach-
ers but also to explain Frankenstein’s attitude towards the old and new sciences:
This professor [Waldman] was very unlike his colleague. He appeared 
about fifty years of age, but with an aspect expressive of the greatest 
benevolence; […] His person was short, but remarkably erect; and his 
voice the sweetest I had ever heard [… and] I attended the lectures, 
and cultivated the acquaintance, of the men of science of the uni-
versity; and I found even in M. Krempe a great deal of sound sense 
and real information, combined, it is true, with a repulsive physiog-
nomy and manners, but not on that account the less valuable. In M. 
Waldman I found a true friend. (30, 32)
Frankenstein’s opinion is based on first impression. He never revises it: Krempe 
is repulsive. He avoids him and loses interest in his teachings. Shelley, conse-
quently, suggests Frankenstein’s preference of Waldman in terms of physical attrac-
tion as well as like-mindedness, which he establishes himself by deducting it from 
physical appearance.
4 Marshall already gestures towards this model when he argues that Frankenstein problematises 
shared likeness: “each character wishes for a fellow being, someone who is like himself. What they 
seek is not a friend or a companion but rather a semblance. It is not a coincidence that the moment 
in which Frankenstein admits being moved and displays compassion in listing to the monster is 
during his plea for a being like himself. Ironically, it is Frankenstein’s creation of a being like him-
self that seems to cut him off from sympathy” (197).
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Shelley’s connection to Lavater, I think, is biographical as well as personal 
and this ubiquity is one of the reasons she set Frankenstein in the 1790s. Shelley’s 
mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, who was friendly with the Swiss-born painter, Henry 
Fuseli, a childhood friend of Lavater’s (Allentuck 89–112), was commissioned to 
translate the abridged German edition of Essays on Physiognomy.5 The second connec-
tion exists through Shelley’s father, William Godwin, who was a friend of Thomas 
Holcroft’s (a translater of Lavater’s physiognomy) and not only called in a physi-
ognomist to have his daughter’s face read in 1797 but also used physiognomy for 
characterization in Caleb Williams, published in 1794 ( Juengel 367–68). William 
Nicholson, the physiognomist examining little Mary’s face a few days after her birth, 
later he wrote to Godwin explaining what he had done and warned that the iden-
tified character traits should be treated as preliminary observations, not because 
Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin’s face was so tiny and therefore difficult to read but 
because the reading had been done in a hurry. Putting Godwin’s expectations aside, 
it is worth noting that Nicholson’s report bears the same stylistic characteristics as 
Lavater’s physiognomical readings. Like Lavater, Nicholson prevaricates. His let-
ter commences with the following caveat:
My view was, in fact, slight and momentary. I had no time to con-
sider, compare, and combine. Yet I am disposed to think the following 
imperfect observation may lead you to more than a suspicion that our 
organization at the birth may greatly influence those motives which 
govern the series of our future acts of intelligence, and that we may 
even possess moral habits, acquired during the foetal state. (Kegan)
Rather than communicate his findings, Nicholson explains what is involved in a phys-
iognomical reading: “time to consider, compare and combine.” Next, he pleads with 
Godwin to accept the scientific basis of his reading. Then he proceeds to list what 
he has found, emphasising that he is drawing on many years of experience:
1. The outline of the head viewed from above, its profile, the outline 
of the forehead, seen from behind and in its horizontal positions, are 
5 Juengel, who hints at Wollstonecraft’s response to physiognomy in Letters Written During a Short 
Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (1796), draws attention to relevant passages in the 1831 intro-
duction and discusses Shelley’s concerns about an engraved portrait of her husband (354, 358, 367).
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such as I have invariably and exclusively seen in subjects who pos-
sessed considerable memory and intelligence.
[...]
4. The form of the nose, the nostrils, its insertion between the eyes, 
and its changes by muscular action, together with the side of the 
face in which the characteristic marks of affection are most promi-
nent, were scarcely examined. Here also is much room for medita-
tion and remark. (Kegan)
Nicholson’s reading exemplifies what is typical of a physiognomical reading; he 
prevaricates about what has been perceived in the face: “Here also is much room 
for meditation and remark.” The first example links its analysis to other, similar 
interpretations of older faces and the second, though similarly inconclusive, appeals 
to a superordinate visual code, which Nicholson had no time to examine. Lavater, 
moreover, delayed or suspended physiognomical judgement whenever he juxta-
posed images to make a point about a certain character trait and its rendering in 
different portraits, all the while educating his readers about details and nuances 
(Erle 134–63). Nicholson’s struggle to both identify and interpret what he has seen 
can be traced to the face-to-face meetings in Frankenstein. Neither Frankenstein’s 
reports nor Walton’s letters give straightforward factual narratives about either the 
Creature’s looks or character.
In Essays on Physiognomy, Lavater uses the word “character” to mean true, inner self, 
which is essential and unchanging. To capture “character,” Lavater says, the physi-
ognomist needs to differentiate between the fixed and the flexible features of a face:
The character, in a state of rest, resides in the form of the solid parts, 
and the inaction of those which are moveable. The character impas-
sioned is to be traced in the motion of the moveable parts. The motion 
is in proportion to the moving power. Passion has a determinate rela-
tion to the elasticity of the man, or that disposition which renders 
him susceptible of passions.
 Physiognomy points out the fund of the human faculties, and 
Pathognomy the interest of revenue which it produces. (1: 23)
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Lavater announces that he intends to analyse fixed and flexible features in equal 
parts, but he comes to focus on the shapes created by the bone structure (physiog-
nomy), claiming that “character” gets contaminated by momentary expression or 
muscular movement (pathognomy). He needs physiognomical readings to be reliable 
and decides to work with portraits. “Character,” for Lavater, is linked to the notion 
of a divine image or likeness, which he associates with the human soul. This original 
becomes fully visible after death and through resurrection (Pestalozzi 286–87). To 
get to this image, Lavater says, the physiognomist has to carefully monitor his feel-
ings during physiognomical observation. Since the image is mediated by the body, 
the physiognomist has to work hard to see it. The soul or “character,” according to 
Lavater, strives to impress itself from the inside (Caflisch-Schnetzler 99).
Lavater’s approach to physiognomy also documents the inner life of the observer, 
because the observer plays a role in the process of observation. Lavater, when exam-
ining a portrait, keeps a record of his feelings: “Every one experiences different sen-
sations conformably to the difference of the Physiognomies which excite them. Every 
figure leaves impressions, which one dissimilar would not have produced” (1: 93). 
Lavater’s practice of physiognomy links a subject (a person) to an object or interpre-
tation (a portrait), while creating an equivalence between what ought to be perceived 
as separate. By default, this reading process and approach to the face draws atten-
tion to the turbulent relationship between difference and similarity, between pro-
jection and expression. This phenomenon applies to Frankenstein. When they meet 
in the Alps, Frankenstein is familiar with the Creature’s physiognomy and pathog-
nomy. When speaking to Walton, his narrative is mediated by memory from the 
earlier meetings as well as by address. His narrative also includes the Creature’s 
story. Frankenstein must successfully navigate between description and recogni-
tion of the facts. His intention is to convince Walton that his version of events is 
the master narrative. Shelley’s technique, a careful layering of points of view, is an 
effective tool with which to critique Lavater’s physiognomical theory. She does not 
solely, as Scott J. Juengel suggests, attack “Lavater’s reification of the body” (373) 
but rather targets his approach for blurring the boundaries between an object and 
its representation.6
6 George C. Grinnell, writing on P. B. Shelley’s “On the Medusa,” considers Lavater in the context 
of British portraiture. He mentions Frankenstein in passing and implies that Shelley, like many oth-
ers, would have found inspiration in Lavater’s physiognomical system “by which visual descrip-
tion blurred into measurements of character” (338).
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Reading Frankenstein as a response to the representation of body-soul relation-
ships in Lavater’s physiognomy, Frankenstein’s description of the immobile and ani-
mated bodies in the narrative of the laboratory scene appears in a new light. While 
staring at the body in front of him, Frankenstein records and reports on its ani-
mation. Firstly, it opens its eye, then it draws its first breath and finally the whole 
body stirs: “I saw the dull eye of the creature open; it breathed hard, and a con-
vulsive motion agitated its limbs” (Shelley 38–39). His gaze follows the course of 
the movement. The animation starts with the eyes and from the lungs before it 
reaches the limbs. Because of the narrative situation, Frankenstein digresses to 
share his reflections. He is talking to Walton and he has since tried to make sense 
of his initial response. Frankenstein could not and still cannot believe his eyes. He 
carefully selected all parts and, for Frankenstein, beauty and its aesthetic experi-
ence are associated with a dead body. This response, however, is at odds with what 
Philippe Ariès, in The Hour of our Death (1981), has described as the typically Western 
attitude towards corpses. A corpse is normally experienced as a “most loathsome 
and abhorred spectacle” (342). Frankenstein’s emotional response includes disgust, 
but due to the narrative situation, the account is also infused with the wisdom of 
hindsight. What disturbs Frankenstein is how movement disrupts the stillness of 
the Creature’s immobile body and what disturbs him even more is the Creature’s 
attempt to speak to him after following him into his bedroom.
It appears that all aspects associated with movement clash with the image cre-
ated by the still body. The Creature’s physiognomy and pathognomy do not work 
in tandem. The assessment of the Creature is carried out in response to two differ-
ent body-images: one immobile and one animated. While the former is denotated 
by it, the latter is attributed a he. Animation, in other words, projects the transition 
from “thing” to “catastrophe.” (More about this transition in a moment.) The nar-
ration of the event is mediated as Frankenstein has told Walton that he carried on, 
even though he resented what he was doing: “often did my human nature turn with 
loathing from my occupation” (37). The description of the transformation of the 
immobile body is part of a carefully-constructed narrative. It includes remembered 
responses as well as reflections which postdate the event and Frankenstein does not 
simply relive the moment because he does not fully identify with his former self:
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How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how deline-
ate the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeav-
oured to form? His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his 
features as beautiful. Beautiful! — Great God! His skin scarcely cov-
ered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lus-
trous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these 
luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery 
eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour of the dun white sock-
ets in which they were set, his shrivelled complexion, and straight 
black lips. (Shelley 39)
Frankenstein’s report mixes emotional response with rational explanation. Taking 
in the features of the animated body, he struggles to comprehend and make sense 
of what he sees: “How can I describe my emotions at the catastrophe”? (39). Even 
though the experiment was a success, Frankenstein immediately labels it a “catas-
trophe.” This is odd as it had always been his intention to create new life and being 
alive means movement. In addition, remembering the immobile body, Frankenstein 
still (when talking to Walton) does not acknowledge that the body he created is 
an assemblage of parts. Instead, he perceives it as a homogenous whole. What 
he describes is skin which “scarcely covered the work of the muscles and arteries 
beneath” (Shelley 39). The skin, he says he saw, is not flabby and the image seems 
to remind him of a trained, muscular body. The turning point in the description 
is signalled through the word “but”: “but these luxuriances” (39). Another “but,” 
indicating yet another change in narrative direction, is in the next passage, where 
Frankenstein explains why he cannot bear to look: “but now that I had finished the 
dream of beauty vanished and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart. Unable 
to bear the aspect of the being I had created, I rushed out of the room” (39). What 
confuses Frankenstein is the very fact of movement and his response is two-fold: 
firstly, he responds to the immobile and then to the animated body.
What is Frankenstein trying to communicate to Walton? The phenomenon 
of movement has already been discussed in terms of a collapse of surface and 
depth ( Juengel 357). Juengel’s interpretation relates to physiognomy but not to 
Lavater’s practice and consequently does not probe deeply enough into the quality 
of Frankenstein’s narrative, which differentiates between the Creature’s physiognomy 
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(bone or fixed features) and its pathognomy (muscle or mobile features). What tends 
to be discussed is the Creature’s perceived ugliness. Denise Gigante, for example, 
focuses on ugliness, which, she contends, triggers Frankenstein’s response. This 
response is basically the same to both the body dead and alive and it only differs 
in intensity. The Creature’s ugliness “did not bother Victor (or anyone else for that 
matter) before he came to life.” In support, Gigante relates back to Frankenstein’s 
explanation to Walton: “he was ugly then; but when those muscles and joints were 
rendered capable of motion, it became a thing such as even Dante could not have 
received” (40). Gigante, too, overlooks the significance of the word “but” and the 
narrative shifts it introduces. Therefore, the transition from beautiful “thing” to 
“catastrophe” in Frankenstein’s mind is not fully explored.
Though the Creature’s ugliness may be a matter of degree, Frankenstein contra-
dicts himself in his description of its effects. He also appears to have expected that 
movement would not substantially interfere with the eagerly anticipated reality of the 
animated body. But it does. As long as the Creature is immobile, Frankenstein con-
siders its body to be “unfinished” (Shelley 40). So, while the change in the Creature’s 
body is expected, the change in Frankenstein’s is not. As manufacturer Frankenstein 
is familiar with the body and yet his narrative prevaricates. He describes it but also 
likens it to a “mummy” (40). The narrative moves back and forth between distanced 
reflection and lasting emotional upset; it is punctuated by several narrative shifts. 
The story is told with hindsight but Frankenstein struggles to control his story and 
it is not clear when exactly the beautiful “thing” becomes a “catastrophe.”
Frankenstein leaves the laboratory in a hurry: “Unable to endure the aspect of 
the being I had created, I rushed out of the room”; his emotions are “breathless hor-
ror and disgust” (39). Exhausted, he falls asleep only to be woken by the horrors of 
his dreams. It is then that he realises that the Creature is looking at him and smiling. 
Very frightened, Frankenstein jumps out of bed and “rushed down stairs” (40). What 
scares him more than anything is the chance of speech (40). This section includes 
reflection and hindsight. Frankenstein never realises nor admits (to Walton) that 
he has misread the Creature’s expression. Judging from the description, “His jaws 
opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds, while a grin wrinkled his cheeks” 
(40), the Creature was not going to attack. The power of speech, which foreshadows 
the Creature’s ability to articulate his feelings, increases the Creature’s capacity for 
agency and social interaction, which this scene intensifies as Frankenstein notices 
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that the Creature reaches out to him. The repetition, first and second encounter in 
short succession, also intensifies his horror. So, rather then enter into a social sit-
uation with the Creature, Frankenstein states that he has to run to save himself. 
Recalling his obsession and decision to prioritise work over time spent with friends 
and family, we are left wondering if he preferred the immobile body because he did 
not have to interact with it.
Frankenstein’s assessment of the body and subsequent rejection of the Creature 
resembles Lavater’s physiognomical readings, because Lavater, too, preferred por-
traits to people. While a portrait for Lavater at least holds the features in perfect 
balance, its animated version makes a secure evaluation of character impossible. 
Thinking of the immobile and animated bodies in terms of two images represent-
ing the identity of the Creature helps to explain not only the injustice done to the 
Creature but also the bias of Frankenstein’s story. Read against Lavater’s physiogno-
mical practice, Frankenstein, like a physiognomist, first looks at a portrait (immobile 
body) and then encounters the person it represents (animated body). The Creature 
is not what he expected it to be — beautiful and good. But Frankenstein so many 
would think, draws the wrong conclusion. Frankenstein, indeed, panics because 
the body moves and speaks but not in the way he had envisioned. Lack of interac-
tion had guaranteed Frankenstein a position of control both as a scientist or inven-
tor and a creative artist. The social situation he shares with Walton, the retelling 
of the event, evidences that he has lost narrative control and is trying to regain it.
In the context of the story, Frankenstein calms down only when he runs into 
Henry Clerval. Seeing Clerval has a positive effect: “his presence brought back to 
my thoughts my father, Elizabeth, and all those scenes of home so dear to my recol-
lection. I grasped his hand, and in a moment forgot my horror and misfortune; I felt 
suddenly, and for the first time during many months, calm and serene joy” (Shelley 
41). Shelley’s description of Frankenstein regaining control over his emotions is lit-
tered with references to beautiful and familiar faces. The calming effect they have 
chimes with the physical connection that Lavater says exists between the observer 
and the observed: “Our imagination operates upon our physiognomy. It assimilates the face, 
in some measure, to the object of our love or hatred. […] Our face is a mirror which 
reflects the objects for which we have a singular affection or aversion” (3: 182). Here, 
Clerval, a dear old friend, has been looking for him, and his arrival returns ‘love’ 
into Frankenstein’s life and body. Shelley heightens the impact of the meeting by 
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introducing touch; that is, Frankenstein, who refused to touch the Creature, recog-
nises his friend and embraces him.
The third meeting with the Creature takes place in the Alps. Regarding emo-
tion, it starts with rage and horror and moves on to compassion. Seeing the Creature 
running towards him, Frankenstein tells Walton, “I trembled with rage and hor-
ror, revolving to wait his approach, and then close with him in mortal combat” 
(76). The scene in the Alps brings Shelley’s critique of Lavater’s practice into focus 
because, during the third encounter, the Creature, whose appearance (not his per-
son) once again upsets Frankenstein, becomes an active participant in the process 
of observation and character scrutiny; the Creature prevents visual exposure and 
asks to be listened to: “‘Thus I relieve thee, my creator,’ he said, and placed his 
hated hands before my eyes, which I flung from me with violence; ‘thus I take from 
thee a sight which you abhor. Still thou canst listen to me, and grant me thy com-
passion’” (Shelley 79).
Wanting to protect Frankenstein from the cold, the Creature invites him to go 
to a mountain hut where they can talk: “I followed. My heart was full, and I did 
not answer him; but, as I proceeded, I weighed the various arguments that he had 
used, and determined at least to listen to his tale. I was partly urged by curiosity, 
and compassion confirmed my resolution” (Shelley 79). In Frankenstein’s interior 
monologue “but” indicates the change in his track of thoughts. The non-visual 
information sways him, though not for long. As we know, Frankenstein would never 
finish the female body he promises to create. His reflections are equally revealing:
His words had a strange effect upon me. I compassionated him, and 
sometimes felt a wish to console him; but when I looked upon him, 
when I saw the filthy mass that moved and talked, my heart sickened, 
and my feelings were altered to those of horror and hatred. I tried to 
stifle these sensations; I thought, that as I could not sympathize with 
him, I had no right to withhold from him the small portion of hap-
piness which was yet in my power to bestow. (121)
Frankenstein listens and is momentarily able to connect with the Creature. He feels 
for him. However, when he looks at his face, he sways back though not immediately 
and not completely. It is not clear how much time has passed. The account, again 
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directed at Walton, includes traces of sympathy (in Smith’s sense) and therefore cre-
ates the impression that, this time, Frankenstein imagines himself in the Creature’s 
‘situation.’ But again, Frankenstein speaks in hindsight as well as to Walton. He says 
that he wanted to help (Shelley 122). On the way down Frankenstein remembers 
what he saw, he undergoes a change of heart. It is the visual rather than the audi-
tory that has a lasting effect on him: “Can you wonder […] that I saw continually 
about me a multitude of filthy animals inflicting on me incessant torture, that often 
extorted screams and bitter groans?” (123). On the way back, the conversation as 
well as the promise dissolve into “screams” and “groans” and the visual wins out over 
the auditory. Frankenstein is overwhelmed and can no longer control his emotions.
Narration plays a central role in the novel’s demonstration of the failure of 
sympathy. Arguing for “compensatory compassion,” established through listening, 
Jeanne Britton writes that “Frankenstein parses sympathy’s elements and repeat-
edly makes the simultaneous alignment of physiological resemblance, visual expe-
rience, and auditory engagement impossible” (3). To highlight the complexity of the 
issue addressed by Britton, the final part of this essay analyses Walton’s assessment 
of the Creature, paying particular attention to the role of voice.
The Creature tried to argue his case with De Lacey and Frankenstein (in the 
Alps), thinking that his voice was not too bad. He was convinced that he could rea-
son with his interlocutors but was proven wrong and had all but given up by the 
time he met Walton. In Essays on Physiognomy, Lavater explores the possibility of 
voice analysis. Voices, he writes, “are most frequently associated” with foreheads: 
“If you have any delicacy of ear, be assured that the sound of the voice will soon fur-
nish you with infallible indications by which you may distinguish the class of the 
forehead, of the temperament, of the character” (Lavater 2: 419). He also coins the 
expression “physiognomical ear,” which, he says, many blind people have acquired, but 
admits that he has never mastered the “art of Music” (2: 240). Lavater’s writing on 
voice complements his ideas on appearance:
of every species of dissimulation, that of language, however refined it 
may be, is the most easily detected. But how is it possible to express, 
by signs, all the sounds of voice so prodigiously varied! We cannot 
even acquire the power of counterfeiting them; for the most part we 
disfigure them. (2: 240–1)
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Lavater, in short, associates sound with truth and, therefore, with the original 
image he is searching for in the face he is analysing. If Shelley read Lavater, this 
passage would explain why De Lacey, who functions as an intermediary between 
Frankenstein and Walton,7 is old as well as blind. De Lacey’s treatment of the 
Creature foreshadows Walton’s willed and controlled response at the end of the novel.
Whereas visual information dominates Frankenstein’s meetings with the 
Creature, the meeting with Walton is guided by auditory information. Walton is 
writing a letter to his sister, but stops as he has heard a noise: “I am interrupted. 
What do these sounds portend? […] Again; there is a sound as of a human voice, but 
hoarser; it comes from the cabin where the remains of Frankenstein still lie. I must 
arise, and examine” (Shelley 186). Walton senses danger but quickly associates the 
sounds with a human voice. On his return, he finishes his story, talking about a vis-
ually overpowering finale — “I am yet dizzy with the remembrance of it” (186) — , 
but he soon regains control and continues his letter, allowing his sister to enter into 
the social situation (in Smith’s sense) he has just experienced.
Walton’s account is much more immediate and, therefore, perhaps more truthful 
than Frankenstein’s, but it also echoes the narrative strategies used by Frankenstein in 
the laboratory scene. Though lost for words, Walton securely identifies the Creature’s 
deformed proportions, mentioning the now “long locks of ragged hair” (Shelley 187). 
His talk of the skin, which is wrinkled and discoloured “like that of a mummy” (187), 
confirms all of Frankenstein’s descriptions. In the Arctic, however, the order of the 
description is reversed because the face comes last: “Never did I behold a vision so 
horrible as his face, of such loathsome yet appalling hideousness” (187). Walton is 
overwhelmed by the Creature’s ugliness, but after looking him in the face, he says, 
he “involuntarily” shut his eyes (187). With his eyes shut, Walton tells his sister, he 
can think and remember his “duties” (187).
Walton calls out, asks the Creature to stay, and when he opens his eyes he begins 
to read the expressive body: “every feature and gesture seemed instigated by the 
wildest rage of some uncontrollable passion” (Shelley 187). He steps closer: “my first 
7 “The monster understands his own investment in his powers of eloquence and persuasion; he 
realizes that his fate depends on his ability to move others through a recital of his autobiography. 
He delays his appeal to the De Laceys until he has confidence in his mastery of their language” 
(Marshall 194). And: “The monster, of course, knows perfectly well that sight will not be adequate 
if the representation of his tragedy is to have any effect other than horror; it is for this reason that 
he first approaches the blind De Lacey” (195).
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impulses […] were now suspended by a mixture of curiosity and compassion” (187). 
The idea of control is evoked by the notion of suspended emotions. Walton is able 
to approach but also decides to keep his eyes averted, knowing that this is the only 
way to stay in control: “I dared not again raise my looks upon his face, there was 
something so scaring and unearthly in his ugliness” (187). Again, he cannot speak; 
when he can, he confronts the Creature: the display of “stings of remorse” is wasted 
on him (187). Just as in the Alps, a conversation ensues and Walton feels compassion. 
In the Arctic, the interaction between the interlocutors, however, is completely dif-
ferent. The Creature howls for pain. Walton shrinks back but steps closer so that 
he can hear what the Creature has to say. He keeps his eyes averted and needs time 
to recover but is curious as well as impatient. When he is able to speak, they talk 
about revenge and remorse. The pace of Walton’s report is swift and Shelley, in fact, 
has Walton meet the Creature twice and in short succession, thus echoing the lab-
oratory and bedroom scenes.
Impelled by the memory of Frankenstein’s narrative, Walton decides to take 
another look and promptly, so he tells his sister, “indignation was rekindled” (Shelley 
188). Resentment, it turns out, is exactly what the Creature is feeling at this moment 
in time: “You hate me; but your abhorrence cannot equal that with which I regard 
myself. I look on the hands which executed the deed; I think on the heart in which 
the imagination of it was conceived, and long for the moment when they will meet 
my eyes, when it will haunt my thoughts no more” (190). The Creature agrees with 
Walton, declaring that he deserves to be hated. He confirms that his body ought 
to be read as a representation of moral depravity as well as of the evil deeds he has 
committed. This act of moral self-judgement does away with the two positions of 
observer and observed. The emotional distance between the narrator’s voice and 
its assessment gives weight to the finality of the judgement: the Creature is a mon-
ster. He has turned his eyes on to himself but remains in control. Addressing his 
maker, he says: “my agony was still superior to thine; for the bitter sting of remorse 
may not cease to rankle in my wounds until death shall close them for ever” (191).
Characteristic of all meetings discussed in this essay is excessive emotion in the 
observer. The Creature’s actions, by comparison, are deliberate and never sponta-
neous. While Frankenstein persists and pursues his agenda, which is to justify his 
actions, Walton is able to recognise and respect the Creature’s suffering. He man-
ages his emotional response to appearance; he only reassures himself that what 
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he has been told is true. When Walton remembers that Frankenstein warned him 
of the Creature’s eloquence, he briefly relapses into rage. Interestingly, the inten-
sity of this emotion increases once he looks at the “lifeless form” of his “friend” 
Frankenstein (Shelley 188). This means that Shelley completely reverses the rela-
tionship between observer and observed. In the Arctic, rage is triggered by a corpse 
rather than a corpse-turned-animated body. Shelley, in short, turns Lavater’s phys-
iognomical practice on its head by working towards a scene which confirms oth-
erness rather than likeness. It is the Creature who identifies his moral deviousness 
with his physical ugliness and Walton feels for the Creature, while disagreeing with 
Frankenstein. Agreement and feelings of recognition (signs of increasing self-knowl-
edge, according to Lavater) are crucial to Lavater’s practice (Erle 35–53).
Walton’s decision to listen and to not look can be read as Shelley’s critique of 
the physiognomy project but especially his approach and practice. Lavater never 
entered into a dialogue with the person whose character he was analysing and in 
Frankenstein, only by not looking, can Walton do the Creature justice. While the 
portraits discussed in Essays on Physiognomy had no chance to talk back, Shelley not 
only gives the Creature his own voice, she also has Frankenstein convey his point of 
view so that Walton can know both sides before he meets the Creature face-to-face. 
In the Arctic, the challenge to understand the Creature’s situation in life is finally 
met. Acknowledging the hopelessness of the situation, Walton realises that he has 
nothing in common with Frankenstein. This disentanglement or breakdown of the 
relationship between observer and observed, so carefully triangulated by Shelley, 
is confirmed by the Creature because he does not expect or ask for sympathy: “‘But 
soon,’ he cried, with sad and solemn enthusiasm, ‘I shall die, and what I now feel 
be no longer felt. Soon these burning miseries will be extinct” (191). The Creature 
defines himself through the emotions he feels inside his body as well as in relation to 
outside responses to his appearance. He experiences the physical identity imposed 
on him through his body, remembers his crimes but also says that his loneliness is 
unbearable. The Creature is a sentient being, capable of love and compassion and 
he has a will of his own. To find relief and protect himself from further humilia-
tion, he says, he chooses to die and thus rid himself (his soul) of the body manufac-
tured by Frankenstein.
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